Battles of the Nineteenth Century, Page 134.

The Bombardment of San Juan

            As we have seen, popular opinion in America looked on an attack upon Havana as the operation with which the naval war would begin.  Expert opinion had selected another objective.  The great island of Puerto Rico, with its fortified harbour of San Juan, was a point which the Spanish fleet might make it base of operations in the Western seas.  The Spanish garrison, under General Machias, had been busy strengthening the batteries and preparing for a siege, and rumour spoke of the harbour as the point where Cervera?s fleet would coal, and of other supplies awaiting it when it crossed the Atlantic.  The garrison of the island was small compared to the large army under Marshal Blanco?s command in Cuba.  Its reduction would not be such a formidable and costly operation as the invasion of the larger island, and although there was no movement against Spanish rule in Puerto Rico, its conquest would be of the highest importance for the development of the naval power of the United States.

            The strategically value of Puerto Rico has been so clearly set forth by Captain Mahan-the chief living exponent of naval strategy-that his statement may be quoted here in his own words.  Writing on the naval lessons of the war, and dealing with the problem of the choice of an objective for the fleet at the outbreak of hostilities, he says: -  

            ?It would have been open to urge that Puerto Rico, being between five and six hundred miles from the eastern ends of Cuba, and nearly double that distance from the two ports of the island most important to Spain-Havana on the north and Cienfuegos on the south-would be invaluable to the mother country as an intermediate naval station, and as a basis of supplies and reinforcements for both her fleet and army; that, it left in her undisturbed possession, it would be enable her, practically, to enjoy the same advantage of nearness to the great scene of operations that the United States had in virtue of our geographical situation; and that therefore the first objective of the war should be the eastern island, ands its reduction the first object.  The affect of this would have been to throw Spain back upon her home territory for the support of any operations in Cuba, thus entailing upon her an extremely long line of communications, exposed everywhere throughout its course, but especially to the molestation of small cruisers issuing from the harbours of Puerto Rico, which flank the routes and which, upon the supposition, would have passed into our hands.  This view of the matter was urged upon the writer, a few days before hostilities began, by a very old and intelligent naval officer who had served in our own navy and in that of the Confederate States.  To a European nation the argument must have been quite decisive; for to it, as distant, or more distant than Spain from Cuba, such an intermediate station would have been an almost insurmountable obstacle while in an enemy?s hands, and an equally valuable base of wrested from him.  To the United States these considerations were applicable only in part; for, while the inconvenience to Spain would be the same, the gain to us would be but little, as our lines of communication to Cuba neither required the support of Puerto Rico, nor were by it particularly endangered.

            ?This estimate of the military importance of Puerto Rico should never be lost sight of by us as long as we have any responsibility, direct or indirect, for the safety or independence of Cuba.  Puerto Rico, considered militarily, is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian canal, and to our Pacific coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and the beyond; and there is for us the like necessity to hold and strengthen the one, in its entirety and in its immediate surroundings, that there is for Great Britain to hold the other for the security of her position in Egypt, for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the control of the route to India.  It would be extremely difficult for a European State to sustain operations in the eastern Mediterranean with a British fleet at Malta.  Similarly, it would be very difficult for a Transatlantic State to maintain operations in the Western Caribbean with a United States fleet based upon Puerto Rico and the adjacent islands.  The same reasons prompted Bonaparte to seize Malta in his expedition against Egypt and India in 1798.  In his masterly eyes, as in those of Nelson, it was essential to the communications between France, Egypt and India.  His scheme failed, not because Malta was less than invaluable, but for want of adequate naval strength, without which no maritime position possesses value.?

            Acting on such considerations as these Admiral Sampson determined to bombard the batteries of San Juan, Puerto Rico, as a prelude to an attack in which a small land force would co-operate.  There were already sufficient troops available for such an operation.  It was never expected that the first attack by the fleet would secure the surrender of the place.  All that was hoped for was that the batteries would be so crippled as to clear the way for a serious attack, while, at the same time, the defences of the place could be thoroughly reconnoitred.  Accordingly, Admiral Sampson, having refilled his coalbunkers and magazines at Key West, sailed for Puerto Rico, leaving his lighter ships to maintain the blockade of Cuba.

            San Juan is at once the military stronghold and the chief harbour of Puerto Rico.  It is the only port, which is sheltered from the heavy gales of the winter season.  The deep water inside it is not of any great extent.  There are two entrances, one to the west, and the other to the east of the rocky island on which the city of San Juan is built.  The eastern entrance, by the San Antonio Channel, is so shallow that only the smallest craft can use it.  It is guarded, nevertheless, by the two forts of San Geronimo and San Antionio, which are also intended to prevent an attacking force seizing the east en of the island.  Across the island, near the forts, there run two lines of entrenchments.  The western or main entrance to the harbour is under the walls and batteries of the city.  It is so narrow as to be easily protected by mines.  On the west of it is the strong fort of Canuelo, built on a shoal between Cabras Island and Palo Seco Point.  This fort crosses its fire with that of the guns of Morro Castle and the St. Helena and San Augustin batteries on the town side of the channel.  The city is completely surrounded by a bastioned wall, and on the sea front the defences are formed by the castles of Morro and San Cristobal, with a strong wall and a number of minor batteries between.  Many of the batteries and forts are wholly or partly cut out of the living rock.  There are large magazines and bomb-proofs in the rock under the fortifications.  Several modern guns of large calibre had been mounted on the seaward batteries during the weeks of busy preparation before the war.  General Machias, the commandant, was a good soldier, who had made the most of resources for defence at his command.

            The fleet with Admiral Sampson concentrated for the attack on San Juan consisted of the armoured cruiser New York (his battleship), the battle ships Iowa and Indiana, the monitors Terror and Amphitrite, the cruisers Detroit and Montgomery, the tug Wampatuck, and the torpedo boat Porter.

            At dawn on Thursday May 12^th, the fleet was off San Juan.  The day was fine, and the air almost perfectly still; but there was a heavy swell on the sea, and as the morning advanced it was oppressively hot.  The attacking fleet kept under easy steam, running in and delivering its fire, then, turning, standing out a little to sea and coming in again so as to bring the guns on the other side to bear.  In this way the range was continually varied, to the obvious puzzlement of the Spanish gunners.  At a quarter past five the squadron opened fire, making its first advance upon the forts.  Morro Castle was the chief object of attack, and the Porter ran boldly in between the big ships and the shore, having orders to lie in wait for and torpedo any Spanish warship that might happen to be in the harbour, in case she should venture out.  There was an idea, quite unfounded, that one of the powerful armed cruisers of the Spanish navy was at San Juan, and that she might make a dash at the fleet.  Hence the position assigned to the Porter.  The torpedo boat kept to the eastward of Morro, and it was supposed that there were no heavy guns on the sea wall at this point.  But here, again the Intelligence Department was at fault, for, as the large ships turned out to sea, a battery opened fire from this very section of the wall.  ?The little Porter? wrote her commander, ?occupied a position of undue prominence, and in consequence received the entire attention of this battery, directly under which she lay.  It is hard to understand how much a storm of projectiles could all have missed her; but it was not a chance to be risked a second time, and before the battery could fire again the Porter was turning out at full speed, firing back with her one-pounders, and swallowed up in a cloud of black smoke from her two funnels.  It was a narrow escape, and it is evident our report of no damage and no casualties was received by the flagship with much relief.?

            When the fleet closed in for its next attack, the Admiral signalled to the lighter cruisers to keep well out from the forts, and the rest of the bombardment, which lasted just three hours, was left to the heavy-armoured vessels-the New York, the two battleships, and the two monitors.  As the big ships ran up and down along the sea front, the smoke of their guns hung heavily around them, and this, with the steady rolling of the swell, made accurate practice by no means easy.  The Spaniards were not shooting badly.  Although the range was considerable, their shells were hurtling close overhead, or churning up the water round the armoured ships, and every now and then there was a crash and a loud explosion as a shell from the shore burst on the armoured side, or went smashing through the gear overhead.  One seaman was killed and two badly wounded by a shell that burst on the deck of the flagship.  Three men were wounded by another shell that burst and blew a boat to pieces near the forward bridge of the Iowa.  Admiral Sampson had gone onboard the battleship to confer with Captain Evans, and the two officers were talking together on the bridge when the shell burst.  Several of the fragments whistled close around them, and one of these broke the rail of the bridge Altogether the Iowa was hit eight times, but the only serious damage was a broken steam pipe.  Two killed and seven wounded was the total loss of the squadron during the three hours fight, and of the dead, one, a gunner of the monitor Amphitrite, lost his life, not from the Spanish fire, but from heat stroke.

            The American fire was not much more effective.  Four killed and several wounded was the loss reported by Machias.  The first reports in the United States newspapers declared that the three hours bombardment had silenced the forts and ruined the city, and that the white flag was hoisted on Morro; so that Sampson might have taken possession of the place if he had a landing force with him to garrison it.  But the detailed matter-of-fact statements of correspondents who watched the fight showed that this story of victory was a mere fabrication.  One of them, dating his despatch from on board the Iowa, wrote: ?No traces of the bombardment were discernible on the forts except small fires, which were apparently extinguished before the fleet left?; and another, dating his despatch from the press-boat Dauntless, said: ?At the close of the engagement the fortification had a very dilapidated appearance, but the guns were as active as ever.?

            At a quarter to eight the Admiral signalled first, ?Cease fire,? and then ?Retire.?  An immense quantity of ammunition had been expended, but not a single Spanish gun had been silenced.  The Terror, the last ship in the line, either misunderstood or disregarded the signal, and as she slowly drew off, exchanged distant shots with Murro.  The monitors were so slow that the other ships often towed them, and as the fleet retired a towline helped one of them along from a light cruiser.  This was the origin of the Spanish report that one of the ?Yankees? had been so disabled that she had to be towed out of action.  But even after discounting this imaginary success, General Machias had good reason to be proud of the day?s work.  He had held his own for three hours against the American fleet.  His works and batteries were practically intact.  A few buildings in the town were damaged.  An English merchant steamer and the French cruiser Rigault de Genouilly, lying in the bay, had been slightly damaged by long ranging shells.  This was all.  No wonder the Spanish general claimed a victory, and the news was received with enthusiasm in Madrid.  It was one more confirmation of the view that well constructed forts have little to fear even from a powerful fleet.

            Throughout the war the Spaniards never showed any want of courage, but in this fight at San Juan one of their signallers showed an example of cool daring that excited the admiration of the attacking fleet.  He was posted on the highest tower of the Morro Castle, standing all alone by his signal staff in a most exposed position.  Throughout the bombardment he never seemed to pay the least attention to the shells that hurtled past him or burst around the tower.  He worked his signals, cool, self-possessed, and to the delight of even his opponents, all unharmed.

            At the close of the fight the American wounded were sent on board the naval hospital ship for conveyance to Key West.  This ship, a big liner, fitted up as a floating ambulance and hospital, and renamed the Solace, was a new feature in naval warfare.  She was painted white in order to distinguish her from the fighting ships, and although the Geneva Convention does not directly apply to naval war, she flew the Red Cross flag.  It was a new departure, which will doubtless be followed by other navies.  It is curious to note that a Spanish writer first proposed this arrangement for naval hospitals in war a few years ago.

            Swift upon the tidings from Puerto Rico came further news that seemed at first to augur well for Spain.  Cervera?s fleet, which had been reported to be lying idle at Cadiz, had suddenly appeared in the West Indian seas, only to disappear again to some unknown destination in the Caribbean Sea.  Sampson would hardly have emptied his magazines in the bombardment of San Juan if he had known his enemy was so near.  On the very day of the attack, he received orders to suspend any further operations on the coast of Puerto Rico and to co-operate with the blockading fleet in Cuban waters, under Commodore Watson, and the flying squadron under Schley, from Hampton Roads, in pursuing the Spanish fleet and bringing it to action.

            On April 29^th Admiral Cervera had left the Cape de Verde Islands, steering westward.  He had with him the cruisers Infanta Maria Terresa, Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Cristobal Colon, and three torpedo boats.  The swift cruisers of Admiral Schley?s squadron were looking for him in the Atlantic, but never saw the Spanish ships, and a report that Cervera had run back to Cadiz was for a while credited.  On May 12^th the Spanish Admiral appeared off Martinique.  On the 14^th he was at Curacoa, where he expected to find colliers waiting for him, but they had missed the rendezvous.  He put to sea again next day, and crossing the Caribbean Sea, he entered the almost land-locked harbour of Santiago on May 19^th.  He had throughout evaded the American cruisers, and for a while there was no certainty at the American head-quarters that the report of his arrival at Santiago was not another rumour like that of his return to Cadiz.

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